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This thesis is a study of the resiliency and recover-
ability of the light infantry company utilizing the Analysis
of Military Organizational Effectiveness (AMORE) method-
ology. The efficiency of the current organizational struc-
ture of the company is determined by measuring its
capability against its remaining resource level after the
application of degradation. A discussion of the AMORE meth-
odology and the light infantry concept is followed by the
extensive input requirements of the model. A sensitivity
analysis is conducted to examine the effects of changes in
input parameters on the company reconstitution capabilities.
The methodology is also used to determine those personnel
and materiel that contributed to low rates and levels of
unit recoverability . Based on the criterion established by
Science Applications, Incorporated, this study concluded
that the light infantry company, as it is currently
designed, exhibits adequate resiliency and recoverability at
degradation levels between 10 and 50 percent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AMORE METHODOLOGY
The Analysis of Military Organizational Effectiveness
(AMORE) methodology is an analytical approach for deter-
mining unit resiliency and recoverability under combat
conditions. This is accomplished by analyzing the correla-
tion between the unit's mission requirements and its capa-
bility through its available personnel and equipment
resources after applying combat degradation. The unit is
said to be resilient if it is able to reconstitute over the
time period of a mission to a given capability level. The
following factors make a unit resilient on the battlefield
[Ref. 1: p. 1-4]:
1. High substitutability of personnel and materiel.
2. Minimum number of essential skills or materiel items
per function.
3. Reduced probability of kill for both personnel and
materiel
.
4. Self-sufficient organizational elements.
5. Appropriate levels of cohesiveness
.
6. Good standard operating procedures for training and
implementation of reconstitution concepts.
The AMORE methodology is outlined graphically in Figure
1.1 and considers the following [Ref. 1: p. B-5]
:
1. Combinations of personnel and materiel damage.
2. Degradation of personnel and materiel and their
interaction as they merge together to form functional
teams required for combat capability.
3. The state of training and cross- training of indi-




4. Substitutability and repairability of equipment.
5. The organization's ability to reconstitute its func-
tions and regenerate combat capability as a function
of time.
Initially Figure 1.1 defines the unit mission and posture,
which is needed to determine the structure of essential
teams. Then the functional analysis first specifies the
initial strengths (assets) of personnel and materiel
required by the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE).
These assets are then divided into essential teams such that
each will contribute equally to mission accomplishment.
Simultaneously with the functional analysis, the probabili-
ties of degradation for personnel and materiel are deter-
mined. These are often established by the use of Joint
Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) methodologies. Next
the AMORE model simulates the degradation of the unit by
using a Monte Carlo technique and the input probabilities.
Following degradation, the unit undergoes reconstitution by
using a transportation/assignment algorithm and the substi-
tutability data. Finally the model computes the expected
value of the best reconstituted unit capability for the
defined mission and the simulated degradation. This forms
the basis for the output analyses (Chapter III).
According to [Ref. 1: p. 1-7], Science Applications,
Incorporated (SAI) has suggested that, as a minimum, a resi-
lient unit should eventually attain a unit recovery capa-
bility which is linear with respect to damage level. This
defines a reconstituted capability value of 1-PD as the
resiliency threshold where PD is the probability of degrada-
tion for personnel and at least light damage for materiel.
Therefore, a unit is said to be resilient if its reconsti-
tuted capability level meets or exceeds this criterion















































































B. LIGHT INFANTRY CONCEPT
The light infantry was organized out of a necessity to
have a highly-trained unit that could be deployed rapidly in
response to a contingency mission anywhere in the world.
The spectrum of conflict consists of the following scenarios




3. Minor conventional warfare
4. Major conventional warfare
5. Theater nuclear warfare
6. Strategic nuclear warfare
The current heavy forces are designed and structured for
the major conventional warfare scenario. Due to increased















it was determined that light forces were better suited to
meet these kinds of crises. The light infantry is charac-
terized by a capability to maneuver either offensively or
defensively through terrain impassable by vehicles and to
adapt quickly to various modes of ground, air, or water
transport available to the force. It possesses a
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substantial number of automatic weapons to enhance its close
combat capability. Figure 1.3 [Ref. 2: p. iii] shows that a
heavy infantry force such as a mechanized infantry unit in a
deliberate attack on open terrain (desert, plains, valleys)
generates high combat power in terms of firepower, mobility,
and protection. However, this force loses considerable
combat power when it is assigned missions in restrictive
terrain (dry creek beds, urban or built-up areas, dense
forests, mountains, jungles). The light infantry is better
suited to fight in a low- intensity environment in all types
of terrain and climatic conditions or in a mid- to high-
intensity environment (Europe) in close terrain.
A limitation of the light infantry company is that it is
completely foot-mobile, making it vulnerable to enemy
artillery, mortar, and nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) attacks. Its survivability depends greatly on the use
of cover and concealment. The light infantry soldier is the
most versatile, advanced, and effective combat "system" on
the battlefield and will never be duplicated in mechanical
or electrical form [Ref. 3: pp. 28-29]:
1. In one package, the light infantry soldier provides
an optical and aura sensor system (eyes and ears)
tied into a central processor (the brain) with an
incredible range of operating programs and almost
infinite recoverable memory.
2. The system can be rapidly programmed (through
training) and loaded through a voice-recognition
system. It is, thereafter, adaptive and
self -reprogrammable
.
3. It can accept and apply mission-type instructions to
infinitely variable terrain, conditions of visi-
bility, size and composition of enemy force, and







































4. It can assess and select covered and concealed routes
of advance into the enemy rear and onto his flanks.
5. All this is mounted on a multi-flex chassis capable
of negotiating every kind of terrain, including water
obstacles, by self -propulsion.
6. Super robotic arms, hands, and fingers with infinite
degrees of freedom couple the control processor to
weapons and communications devices.
7. This remarkable fighting system includes automatic
and continuous position location, plus situation
analysis and reporting, with a large, flexible (even
entertaining) vocabulary.
8. The "system" performs target detection, identifica-
tion, acquisition, munition and weapon selection,
engagement, damage assessment, and reengagement as
indicated by target condition.
For this unique "system", emphasis is placed on cross-
training and the attainment of individual proficiency on
multiple weapon systems to enhance unit flexibility. Every
effort is placed on commonality in weapons and equipment to
significantly reduce logistical requirements, streamline
maintenance operations, and simplify repair parts manage-
ment. Equipment commonality also reduces operator training
requirements and facilitates cross- training . In other words,
soldiers trained on one system have the basic knowledge to
operate, maintain, and diagnose problems on common equipment
items that are used with other systems [Ref. 4: pp. 5-6].
According to General John A. Wickham, Jr. [Ref. 5: ],
"The smallest Active Army in 34 years requires an Army of
Excellence which optimizes combat power. If we seize this
(light infantry) concept with conviction, innovativeness
,
and vision, the Army's land power will increase and, as a
result, play a more significant role in future U.S.
national security."
17
1. Organization of the Light Infantry Company
The light infantry company is organized as shown in
Figure 1.4 [Ref. 2: p. 2]. It consists of a company head-
quarters platoon, composed of a headquarters section, an
antiarmor (AA) section, and a mortar section, and three
rifle platoons, each composed of a headquarters section and
three rifle squads. A rifle squad operates in two fire
teams, each consisting of four men. The company has no
organic vehicles but it can use the support platoon's motor-
cycles if necessary.
The medium antiarmor weapons (Dragon) are consoli-
dated at company level to preclude encumbering the rifle
platoons with a bulky weapon system that may impede their
rate of movement in a low- intensity environment where armor
targets are scarce. This also enables the company commander
to provide rapid response based on the situation. The
antiarmor section can be used as an additional rifle unit if
the company is not faced with an enemy armor threat . The
M-60 machineguns (two per platoon) are placed, controlled,
and displaced by the platoon leader.
With the availability of night vision goggles and
night vision sights, the light infantry company is capable
of conducting operations under all visibility conditions.
2
.
Missions of the Light Infantry Company
a. Offense
The primary purpose of offensive operations is
to destroy the capability of the enemy and/or his will to
fight. This is accomplished by:
1. Attacking the enemy from the least expected area.
2. Concentrating effort in one direction while forcing
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3. Destroying or wearing down enemy troops.
4. Penetrating the enemy's defenses to attack key combat
service, combat service support, and command,
control, and communications elements.
5. Seizing key terrain to enable maximum capability on
favorable ground.
The light infantry company can achieve maximum
success by employing sound principles of fire and movement
and attacking in restrictive terrain such as towns, swamps,
forests, and mountains. It can also maximize surprise by
attacking the flanks and rear of the enemy at night or
during limited visibility.
The light infantry company is capable of
conducting the following offensive operations [Ref. 4: pp.
B-9 - B-12]
:
1. Movement to contact
2. Hasty attack
3. Deliberate attack
4. Pursuit and exploitation when opposed by light enemy
forces
Movement to contact - conducted to locate the
enemy, develop the situation, and maintain the initiative.
Decentralized control, rapid execution, and responsive fire
support are critical to defeating the enemy.
Hasty attack - conducted to defeat an ill-
prepared enemy force quickly or to take advantage of an
enemy weakness. The effective use of indirect and supporting
weapon systems, suppression of enemy fire support and air
defense, and efficient application of combat support assets
increase the devastating effect of the swift, violent
maneuver against an ill-prepared enemy.
Deliberate attack - conducted to defeat a strong
enemy force in well-prepared positions that cannot be over-
come by a hasty attack. The main effort is directed toward
the enemy's weakest point.
20
Exploitation and pursuit - conducted to cut off
enemy dismounted infantry forces and defeat remaining
forces, conduct military operations on urban terrain (MOUT),
and destroy pockets of resistance.
b. Defense
The light infantry company is capable of
defending against enemy light forces. However, as was
depicted in Figure 1.3, it can also defend against tank and
motorized units in close terrain. Defensive operations are
conducted in order to:
1. Cause an enemy attack to fail by destroying him or
forcing him to withdraw.
2. Control essential terrain or secure a key area to
deny enemy entry.
3. Gain time to prepare for a subsequent offense.
4. Economize forces in one area to allow concentration
elsewhere
.
5. Reduce the enemy capability for offensive action.
The light infantry company is capable of
conducting the following defensive operations:
1. Defend in sector
2. Defend from a battle position
3. Defend a strongpoint
Defend in sector - This is the most frequent
defensive mission. The company defends in an area character-
ized by positions in depth and coordination with adjacent
units. Defending in depth entails drawing the enemy into the
sector and conducting multiple and repeated surprise attacks
throughout the depths of its formation.
Defend from a battle position - This mission is
assigned when key terrain must be held or when the position
is located in a favorable engagement area. It is character-
ized by obstacles to slow the enemy and stop it in the
21
engagement area such that the battle position can engage
targets from the flanks and rear.
Defend a strongpoint - This mission prevents the
enemy from bypassing or reducing the strongpoint without
expending excessive amounts of resources and time. A strong-
point is usually located in restrictive terrain such as
thick forests, mountains, swamps, urban areas, etc., that
cannot be easily bypassed.
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Because of the importance of the light infantry concept
to the United States Army, this thesis investigated the
composition and mechanics of a light infantry company to
identify, from a set of alternatives, the force structure
that maximizes unit resiliency on the battlefield for a
night defensive mission in a nuclear, biological, and chem-
ical (NBC) environment. The AMORE methodology was used to
evaluate the alternatives.
Although the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS)
conducted an AMORE analysis of the light infantry company as
input to the AMORE Analysis of the Light Infantry Division
prepared by Science Applications, Incorporated, it was
constrained by time and resident experience on the AMORE
model, resulting in an analysis that was not performed at
the level of detail and depth as this study. Additionally,
the USAIS analysis considered the organization of the light
infantry company before a mortar section was included in the




Chapter II discusses the input information that must be
determined before the AMORE methodology can be exercised.
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The development of these input data required an extensive
analysis of the unit and its mission in conjunction with
subject matter experts. Chapter III provides the output
analyses based on the transformation of the input informa-
tion into measures of organizational capability. The anal-
yses focus on the recovery potential of the unit and include
developing capability as a function of time and identifying
critical resources. A sensitivity analysis is conducted in
Chapter IV. It examines the effects of changes in degrada-
tion probabilities and the definition of a mission essential
team on unit reconstitution capabilities. Chapter V summa-
rizes the analyses, and presents conclusions and recommenda-




The AMORE methodology requires a significant amount of
input data based on an evaluation of a unit's capabilities,
organizational and operational concepts, and resources
provided in the Table of Organization and Equipment. The
following data elements are required to run the base case
using the AMORE methodology:
1. Unit mission.
2. TOE or starting strength of personnel and materiel.
3. Personnel and materiel transfer matrices.
4. Repair time for materiel.
5. Probability of degradation for personnel and
materiel
.
6. Commander's decision time.
7. Essential team requirements for personnel and
materiel
8. Number of simulation iterations.
B. UNIT MISSION
Although the unit mission is not input directly, it
determines the requirements for essential teams. For this
analysis, the light infantry company is in a six-hour night
defensive posture in a nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) environment. This presents a stressful situation
which requires most of the skill groups and equipment types,
thereby providing the most information about the company
performing its combat function.
24
C. INITIAL STRENGTH
The initial strength pertains to the number of personnel
by grade and military occupational specialty (MOS) and the
number of significant items of equipment specified in the
TOE. These listings are depicted in Table I and Table II.
Although the fire support team chief, the fire support team
sergeant, the fire support team radio telephone operator
(RATELO), the medic, the forward observer, and the forward
observer RATELO are not included in the TOE, they are
usually attached to the light infantry company during opera-
tions and are therefore included in Table I.
D. TRANSFER MATRIX
A transfer matrix identifies the personnel and materiel
that are substitutable for other personnel and materiel and
the amount of time it takes to complete the substitution.
The matrix consists of row and column headings corresponding
to the row or line numbers of the personnel or materiel. An
entry indicates the time, in minutes, it takes for a row
skill or materiel item to substitute for a column skill or
materiel item. Zero entries indicate that substitutions
take place immediately while dots denote substitutions that
would not normally occur or would be infeasible. The diag-
onal entries represent the intersections of the rows and
columns with equal numbers. The transfer times used for
this analysis were developed from discussions with subject
matter experts from the Light Division Certification Board
of the US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center
(CDEC) at Fort Ord.
1 . Personnel
The transfer matrix for personnel displays the
substitutability of one personnel for another in terms of
25
TABLE I
LISTING OF PERSONNEL INITIAL STRENGTHS










































Fire Support Team Chief
Fire Support Team Sergeant

































































































2 Chemical Alarm 1
3 Compass, Magnetic 2
4 Dragon 6
5 Grenade Launcher 40mm M-203 18




8 Mortar bOmm 2
9 Night Vision Goggles AN/P^
Night Vision Sight AN/PVS
/S-5 36
10 -4 18
11 Night Vision Sight AN/TVS -5 6
12 Pistol Caliber .45 7
13 Platoon Early Warning System 3
14 Radiac Detector Charger 1








19 Rifle 5.56mm M- 16A2 84
20 Small Unit Transceiver 12
21 Speech Security Equipment 4







the average time required to reach an acceptable operational
capability. Table III presents the 32 x 32 matrix of
personnel transfer times, in minutes, for the light infantry
company. It can be seen that there is significant potential
for substitution between infantry MOS codes (llxxx; see
Table I) but only limited potential for headquarters
elements and attached personnel (fire support team, forward
observer teams, and medics).
Personnel skill substitutions during reorganization
and reconstitution following degradation were limited to
those substitutions that would normally occur instead of
considering every possibility. For example, although the
company commander has the skill and training to substitute
for a rifleman, he would not assume that role.
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Transfer times ranged from 1 to 45 minutes (with the
exception of diagonal elements). For the most part, the
increased transfer times resulted from substitutions
involving greater differences in proficiency levels and from
the distance that had to be travelled during limited visi-
bility between positions of one personnel to the other. In,
the case of the light infantry company in the defense
mission, that distance could be as much as 750 meters,
depending on the terrain. The time penalty assessed for
travel varied from 5 to 15 minutes.
2 . Materiel
A similar matrix for materiel substitution times is
presented in Table IV. Due to the nature and organization
of the light infantry company, the unit possesses relatively
few essential materiel items. This provides very little
potential for these items to substitute for one another.
The most significant elements of materiel transfer times are
adjustment and repositioning times.
E. MATERIEL REPAIR TIME
The times to repair light (operator level or first
echelon maintenance) and moderate (organizational level or
second echelon maintenance) materiel damage are shown in
Table V. According to [Ref. 6: p. 6], doctrine dictates 18
minutes as the time limit for light repair and four hours as
the time limit for moderate repair. Any equipment exceeding
four hours of repair time is assumed to be not repairable by
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2 Chemical Alarm 18 240
3 Compass, Magnetic 18 240
4 Dragon 18 240
5 Grenade Launcher 40mm M-203 18 240





8 Mortar 60mm 18 240
9 Night Vision Goggles AN/PVS-5
Night Vision Sight AN/PVS-4
18 240
10 18 240
11 Night Vision Sight AN/TVS-5 18 240
12 Pistol Caliber .45 18 240












19 Rifle 5.56mm M-16A2 18 240
20 Small Unit Transceiver 18 240
21 Speech Security Equipment 18 240








F. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION SET
A probability of degradation set (PD set) consists of
both the degradation probabilities and the commander's deci-
sion times for personnel and materiel. This set is
presented in Tables VI and VII. The degradation probabili-
ties for personnel and materiel are determined by the unit
posture and the threat being simulated.
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1. Personnel PD
Personnel probabilities of degradation can be
derived from the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual based
on the light infantry company in a defensive posture against
conventional weapon systems. The recommended degradation
probability is 0.10 by the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at
Fort Leavenworth.
2. Materiel PD
Materiel probabilities of degradation are required
for light and moderate damage (repairable in the unit) and
for severe damage (lost to the unit). The Combined Arms
Center recommended that the corresponding degradation prob-
abilities should be 0.10, 0.05, and 0.02. In Table VII, the
cumulative "at least light" column is the sum of the indi-
vidual light, moderate, and severe PD ' s , the "at least
moderate" column is the sum of the moderate and severe PD ' s
,
and the "severe" column is only the severe PD. These cumu-
lative PD's are required by the AMORE model.
3
.
Commander' s Decision Time
In any given situation following degradation, a
commander needs time to assess the condition of the unit and
decide how to reorganize. This decision time is in addition
to any transfer times (personnel and materiel) except for
diagonal elements. It takes into consideration the time
lost due to the initial impact following an attack, which
may result in a brief period of confusion, demoralization,
and immediate aid to casualties. After the initial reaction
period, the commander's decision time will involve time
elements for damage assessment, communication of damage and
casualty reports, the commander's evaluation and decision
process, and communication of decisions for employment of
36
surviving assets to reconstitute the unit [Ref. 7: page 20].
A time of five minutes, concurred by subject matter experts
at the Light Division Certification Board at CDEC, for all
levels of degradation was used for this analysis.
TABLE VI






Personnel Time (min) Probability
Company Commander 5 0. 10
2 Executive Officer 5 0. 10
3 First Sergeant 5 0. 10
4 Supply Sergeant 5 0. 10
5 Communications Chief 5 10
6 NBC NCO 5 10
7 Armorer 5 0. 10
8 Company RATELO 5 0. 10
9 Fire Support Team Chief 5 0. 10
10 Fire Support Team Sergeant 5 10
11 Fire Support Team RATELO 5 0. 10
12 Antiarmor Section Leader 5 10
13 Antiarmor Team leader 5 10
14 Antiarmor Gunner 5 10
15 Asst Antiarmor Gunner 5 10
16 Mortar Section Leader 5 10
17 Mortar Squad Leader 5 10
18 Mortar Gunner 5 10
19 Ammunition Bearer 5 10
20 Platoon Leader 5 10
21 Platoon Sergeant 5 10
22 Platoon RATELO 5 10
23 Machinegun Gunner 5 10
24 Asst Machinegun Gunner 5 10
25 Medic 5 10
26 Forward Observer 5 10
27 Forward Observer RATELO 5 10
28 Squad Leader 5 10
29 Team Leader 5 10
30 Automatic Rifleman 5 10
31 Grenadier 5 10
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G. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAM (MET)
The AMORE capability analysis requires the breakdown of
the unit into essential teams, consisting of only those
personnel and materiel elements which are necessary to
accomplish a mission. In the case of the light infantry
company, the smallest combat force is the fire team
consisting of the following elements: team leader, automatic
rifleman, grenadier, and rifleman. If an element is missing
for any given essential team, that team then has no mission
capability [Ref. 8: p. 2-10]. Using the fire team as the
basic increment of capability, eighteen teams were
constructed to produce the increment of mission performance.
An effort was made to distribute basic skills and equipment






Table VIII shows the personnel mission essential
teams for the light infantry company. It can be noted that
the teams contain a command element along with a full
complement of infantry, antiarmor, and mortar personnel
required for night defensive operations. The executive
officer, supply sergeant, armorer, fire support team,
medics, and the forward observer teams were not considered
essential to this particular mission.
2 Materiel
The composition of the materiel mission essential
teams of the light infantry company is presented in Table
IX. These elements represent the equipment associated with
the proper personnel. Only major items of equipment are
listed and each item is considered to include all of its
component parts. Some items which are issued on the basis
39
of one per individual (protective masks, bayonets) are not
included.
H. NUMBER OF ITERATIONS
An iteration includes application of damage to personnel
and materiel, assessment of surviving resources, reconstitu-
tion of the maximum number of mission essential teams, and
evaluation of an expected value of unit capability at speci-
fied time periods. The number of iterations must be greater
than or equal to two for proper program execution.
According to the User's Manual [Ref. 9: p. 2-32], fifty
iterations are generally sufficient to provide statistically
significant convergence of results. Thus, fifty iterations
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III. ANALYSES OF UNIT CAPABILITY
A. GENERAL
This chapter looks at those personnel and materiel
factors which influence the light infantry company's ability
to reconstitute its combat capability following an attack.
Some of the factors which affect its recoverability are
[Ref. 1: p. 5-1]:
1. The number of personnel and materiel items which are
authorized by the TOE and the number that survive
after an attack.
2. The transferability of personnel and materiel to
other skills or functions.
3. The time required to accomplish the transfer
(including delay and repair times).
4. The demand of the essential teams for specific types
and numbers of personnel and materiel items
.
The AMORE methodology considers the above factors in
producing the output for the base case from the available
data.
The following assumptions apply in the analyses:
1. Personnel and materiel systems for the base case
light infantry company are from the TOE developed by
the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
2. The light infantry company is at 100% strength (as
defined by the TOE) at the beginning of the mission.
3. Personnel are fully trained and qualified in their
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).
4. Materiel systems are operationally combat ready at
the beginning of the mission.
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5. Available weapon systems have an adequate supply of
ammunition for the entire mission.
6. Stress, fatigue, morale, etc. are not explicitly
considered.
The two most important outputs used as the basis for the
analyses of this chapter are:
1. Unit capability - the average recovery capability the
total unit (both personnel and materiel) has attained
by a given time.
2. Available surpluses and shortages - those elements
(either personnel or materiel) that prevented the
unit from having additional capability (shortages)
and those which are not being utilized (surpluses).
B. UNIT CAPABILITY
1. Mean Fraction of Capability
The rate of reconstitution is a function of the
times required for transfer and/or repair of assets. The
AMORE methodology allows the user to use average times or
random exponential simulated times based on the input mean
or expected times. The exponential distribution is known as
a frequently observed waiting time distribution. For this
analysis, the "mean time only" option was considered suffi-
cient for determining capability.
Table X presents the mean fraction of pre-
degradation capability for personnel and materiel as a func-
tion of time after degradation. These capabilities are
evaluated at the specified time periods, and at minimum and
infinite times. The minimum time capability is evaluated
immediately after the start of the reconstitution. All
transfers are in progress, but only those with a total time
(transfer + commander's decision + equipment repair) of zero
have been completed. Infinite time or maximum capability is
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evaluated when all possible transfers and all possible
equipment repairs have been made. The "Unit" column gives
the unit capability which is the minimum of the personnel
and materiel capabilities derived from the average for all
iterations [Ref. 9: p. 2-50]. Additionally, the confidence
limit based on the t-test of significance for a 90 percent
confidence level (two-sided) is given for each of the mean
capabilities. The basic equation is [Ref. 10: p. 3-84]:
90% CI = +t VX Z - (YX ) 2 / N (eqn 3.1)
n-. / i i
V n"(n"-"I)
where X = capability for iteration i;
i
N = number of simulation iterations (2-=N<CO);
t = table value of t for N-l degrees of freedom,
n
An example of how to read the table is as follows:
after 0.5 hours, personnel regained a mean capability of
96.2 percent, materiel reached 69.9 percent, and the minimum
or unit mean capability was 69.9 percent. Maximum recovery
is accomplished between 4.0 and 4.25 hours. This can be
identified by the first point in time where the value of
unit capability reaches its maximum. The 90 percent confi-
dence interval for the unit capability can be calculated
using eqn. 3 . 1 at that time and the range is from 0.913 to
0.933.
Figure 3.1 depicts the graphical representation of
the mean data presented in Table X. It does not indicate
any significant divergence between the personnel and
materiel capability over time. It does show that materiel
is always the limiting or minimum factor at any time after
0.25 hours. At 0.25 hours the materiel capability and unit
capability become and continue to be equal. Prior to that
47
TABLE X












0.250 747 0.043 0.618 0.032 596 035
0.500 962 0.011 0.699 0.035 699 035
0.750 974 0.007 0.797 0.025 797 025
1.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
1.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
1.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
1.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
2.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
2.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
2.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
2.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
3.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
3.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
3.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
3.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
4.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
4.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
4.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
4.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
5.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
5.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
5.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
5.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
6.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
Infinity 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
time, the personnel capability was lower than the materiel
capability
.
Based on the resiliency threshold (1-PD) discussed
in Chapter I, it can be seen that the light infantry company
is resilient at a 10 percent degradation level (degradation
probability, PD, of 10 percent for personnel and 10 percent
at least light damage for materiel). The maximum capabili-
ties are 97.4 percent and 92.3 percent for personnel and
materiel, respectively. The value of Figure 3.1 to the Army
is that it portrays the light infantry company as being



















































Integral of Unit Capability with Respect to Time
Table XI provides the output of the cumulative area
under the capability curve. This area provides a measure of
the accumulated effective unit hours over the six-hour time
period.
TABLE XI
INTEGRAL OF UNIT CAPABILITY OVER TIME
(BASE CASE)




Minimum 0.376 0.000 0.000
0.250 0.596 0.121 2.185
0.500 0.699 0.283 5.097
0.750 0.797 0.470 8.462
1.000 0.798 0.669 12.050
1.250 0.798 0.869 15.640
1.500 0.798 1.068 19.230
1.750 0.798 1.268 2-2.820
2.000 0.798 1.467 26.410
2.250 0.798 1.667 30.000
2.500 0.798 1.866 33.590
2.750 0.798 2.066 37.180
3.000 0.798 2.265 40.770
3.250 0.798 2.464 44.360
3.500 0.798 2.664 47.950
3.750 0.798 2.863 51.540
4.000 0.798 3.063 55.130
4.250 0.923 3.278 59.002
4.500 0.923 3.509 63.157
4.750 0.923 3.740 67.157
5.000 0.923 3.970 71.467
5.250 0.923 4.201 75.622
5.500 0.923 4.432 79.777
5.750 0.923 4.663 83.932
6.000 0.923 4.894 88.087
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The unit capability (Unit column from Table X), as
mentioned earlier, is the minimum of the personnel and
materiel capabilities derived from the average for all iter-
ations. The unit hours available to the light infantry
company define the maximum potential output of the company
in time. This means that a full-up unit at 100 percent
capability would have one unit hour available in one hour.
Unit output is expressed in terms of team hours where one
team hour is defined as the amount of work one team can do
in one hour. The maximum value for the light infantry
company would be 18 team hours of output work every hour.
The average cumulative area is given in terms of the unit
hours and team hours that are available from the beginning
of reorganization to the desired time. Table XI shows that
0.669 unit hours were available in the first hour or 12.050
team hours from an eighteen- team unit. The light infantry
company has recovered to 79.8 percent capability at the end
of the first hour. However, the potential work the company
could have produced in that hour is only 66.9 percent of a
full-up unit. Figure 3.2 graphically shows the effective
unit hours compared to a reference line representing a unit
at 100 percent capability over the entire time.
C. CHOKE ANALYSIS
The choke analysis output (Appendix A) provides the
information on why the light infantry company was unable to
reconstitute to full capability by infinite time. The
output includes those items needed (Needs), on the average,
to complete the designated team and those items excess
(Surplus), on the average, to the requirements of that team.
































Those personnel and materiel items critical to additional
capability in the unit are identified as need items while
the surplus items show where possible changes in transfer
capability could be used to increase unit recovered capa-
bility. The number of teams attempted (one beyond the
optimal solution team) is provided along with the number of
iterations for which this "next" team was attempted [Ref. 9:
p. 2-53].
1. Personnel Requirements and Shortages
As expected, the richness of total personnel due to
substitutability is apparent in the light infantry company
as evidenced by Tables XXI and XXII in Appendix A. For
example, in the results listed in Table XXI labelled "(Team
18)", seventeen teams were built and the eighteenth team was
attempted to be built. The model failed to complete the
eighteenth team twenty-three times out of the fifty itera-
tions (The other twenty-seven attempts will be shown on
additional printouts at ' the appropriate team level of
attempted completion) . The attempted construction of the
eighteenth team failed (choked) due to the personnel needs
in column one by the amounts specified by the values as
listed. These values were derived by the following
expression:
n
( Y (total number of shortages by skill) )/n
i
i=l
where n = number of failures (iterations).
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The major items contributing to the choke on the eighteenth
team were as follows:
1. Communication Chief (skill number 5)
2. Antiarmor Gunner (skill number 14)
3. Mortar Gunner (skill number 18)
4. Squad Leader (skill number 28)
5. Team Leader (skill number 29)
6. Automatic Rifleman (skill number 30)
7. Grenadier (skill number 31)
Table XXII is denoted by "After Last Team" and indicates
that the "next" team increment solution is not required
since all eighteen teams can be built. Therefore, the
average needs are not necessary, resulting in only a listing
of average surplus and standard deviation of surplus. The
fifty iterations of the simulation are accounted for as
follows: seventeen teams were built in the twenty-three
iterations of Table XXI, and eighteen teams were built in
the twenty-seven iterations (23 + 27 = 50) of Table XXII.
2. Materiel Requirements and Shortages
Tables XXIII through XXVI in Appendix A display the
choke analysis output for materiel. An examination of Table
XXIV shows that the sixteenth team was attempted five times,
resulting in a maximum capability of fifteen teams. This
was caused by a lack of materiel items 18 and 20. On the
average, team sixteen required 0.80 of item 18, an AN/PRC-77
radio set, and 0.20 of item 20, a small unit transceiver.
In other words, in four of the five iterations an AN/PRC-77
radio set was needed to build the sixteenth team while the
remaining iteration required a small unit transceiver.
Analyzing the remainder of the choke data for materiel in a
similar method results in a Dragon (item number 4) being
needed to build the fifteenth team in one iteration, a
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binocular (item number 1) being needed to build the seven-
teenth team in one of the six iterations, and a Dragon being
needed in the other five iterations. Thirty-eight itera-
tions choked on team eighteen in Table XXVI due to a lack of
most of the materiel items. To account for all fifty itera-
tions of the materiel run, the following summary of results
is provided:











Based on the results from the analyses of the two
outputs, the following observations are made:
1. The recovery capability of the light infantry company
at the end of its assigned mission indicates that it
is resilient at the 10 percent level of degradation.
2. Resiliency is limited by some items of equipment,
particularly the Dragon which is a low-density equip-
ment. Improving survivability for the Dragon would
increase reconstitution capability.
3. Although all eighteen personnel essential teams were
built in 54 percent of the iterations, improved capa-
bility could be accomplished by increasing the
ft






This chapter investigates how sensitive the AMORE simu-
lation output measure of effectiveness of the light infantry-
company is to changes in the input parameters. A review of
existing AMORE literature indicates that the model provides
sensitivity analyses to changes in practically every input
factor. This analysis examined the sensitivity to changes
in the following input parameters, which are considered by
the author to be of primary importance to the light infantry
company analysis:
1. Probability of degradation
2. Mission essential teams
These will be referred to as Alternative Cases I and II.
B. PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION
1. Small Variations in Personnel PD
The base case in Chapter III assumed a 10 percent
probability of degradation for all personnel in the light
infantry company. This section will allow the degradation
probabilities to vary with the relative location of each of
the personnel in the defensive position. It should be
expected that vulnerability levels would vary depending on
the degree of exposure. Table XII illustrates such a
possible situation. As an example, squad members (PD =
0.12) are more exposed to direct fire weapons than those
personnel in the company headquarters position (PD = 0.08).
These probability of degradation values were developed from
discussions with subject matter experts at the Light
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Division Certification Board at CDEC. It was determined
that values between 0.06 and 0.14 would be considered
reasonable to classify as a light level of damage.
TABLE XII






Personnel Time (min) Probability
Company Commander 5 0.12
2 Executive Officer 5 0.08
3 First Sergeant 5 0.08
4 Supply Sergeant 5 0.08
5 Communications Chief 5 0.08
6 NBC NCO 5 0.08
7 Armorer 5 0.08
8 Company RATELO 5 0.08
9 Fire Support Team Chief 5 0.08
10 Fire Support Team Sergeant 5 0.08
11 Fire Support Team RATELO 5 0.08
12 Antiarmor Section Leader 5 0.12
13 Antiarmor Team leader 5 0.12
14 Antiarmor Gunner 5 0.12
15 Asst Antiarmor Gunner 5 0.12
16 Mortar Section Leader. 5 0.08
17 Mortar Squad Leader 5 0.08
18 Mortar Gunner 5 0.08
19 Ammunition Bearer 5 0.08
20 Platoon Leader 5 0.12
21 Platoon Sergeant 5 0.12
22 Platoon RATELO 5 0.10
23 Machinegun Gunner 5 0.12
24 Asst Machinegun Gunner 5 0.12
25 Medic 5 0.10
26 Forward Observer 5 0.10
27 Forward Observer RATELO 5 0.10
28 Squad Leader 5 0.12
29 Team Leader 5 0.12
30 Automatic Rifleman 5 0.12
31 Grenadier 5 0.12
32 Rifleman 5 0.12
The AMORE model was then run with all other input
parameters kept constant. Table XIII displays the mean











432 0.037 0.580 0.028 399 032 .
0.250 702 0.047 0.604 0.029 547 036
0.500 949 0.014 0.710 0.034 708 033
0.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
1.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
1.250 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
1.500 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
1.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
2.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
2.250 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
2.500 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
2.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
3.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
3.250 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
3.500 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
3.750 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
4.000 963 0.007 0.812 0.026 812 026
4.250 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
4.500 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
4.750 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
5.000 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
5.250 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
5.500 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
5.750 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
6.000 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
Infinity 963 0.007 0.928 0.011 927 Oil
A comparison with the base case is presented in
Table XIV and shows that this set of PD values resulted in a
slightly increased unit capability due to an improvement in
materiel capability. It seems logical that they should have
been identical since the probabilities of degradation for
materiel do not change. The reason for the difference is
due to the stochastic process and the "sort" routine used in
the AMORE model. The first iteration change will throw all
subsequent results out of sequence from the original run,
thus yielding different results. The graphical comparison
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of the resiliency curves of both cases over all time periods




COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY











In this case, although the changing of the prob-
ability of degradation for personnel based on their degree
of exposure to enemy direct fire weapons increased the capa-
bility of the light infantry company, the difference was not
deemed significant enough to draw any viable conclusions.
2. Broad Variations of Personnel and Materiel PD Levels
The effect of widely varying levels of degradation
probabilities for personnel along with a corresponding
change to materiel probabilities of degradation was analyzed
next. The degradation levels used include the base case as
level 1 and are listed in Table XV. The results of running
the AMORE model for each level are provided in Appendix B.
Figure XVI presents the capability of the light infantry
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LEVELS OF PROBABILITY OF DEGRADATION
Materiel PD (Cumulative)







2 .20 .20 .10 .04
3 .30 .30 .15 .06
4 .40 .40 .20 .08
5 .50 .50 .25 .10
TABLE XVI
MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY











The recovery capability of the light infantry
company based on Table XVI is displayed in Figure 4.2.
According to the resilience threshold (1-PD), it can be seen
that the company is resilient between the 10 percent and 50
61
percent levels of degradation. Its capability to reconsti-
tute after degradation is primarily limited by the number of
survivors and not by the shortage of any particular skill or
materiel items.
C. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS
Although doctrine states that the rifle fire team is the
smallest combat fighting force, its size (four members)
under the light infantry concept may preclude it from under-
taking very many missions. Therefore, in this section the
squad will be considered as the basic increment of capa-
bility in determining mission essential teams. This results
in nine mission essential teams for both personnel and
materiel (Tables XVII and XVIII) versus eighteen for the
rifle fire teams. The same total number of personnel and
materiel was used in constructing these new mission essen-
tial teams.
The AMORE model was again run with all other input
parameters kept constant. Table XIX displays the mean frac-
tion of capability for personnel and materiel.
This trial resulted in a significant decrease in unit
capability compared to the base case as shown in Table XX.
Both personnel and materiel capabilities are lower at infi-
nite time. Although personnel capability exceeds the
criterion value of 1-PD as the resiliency threshold, the
unit as well as the materiel does not, resulting in the
company being not resilient. Figure 4.3 presents a graph-
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0.651 0.018 413 034
0.250 0.649 0.038 0.671 0.015 593 026
0.500 0.871 0.030 0.747 0.029 718 029
0.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
1.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
1.250 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
1.500 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
1.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
2.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
2.250 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
2.500 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
2.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
3.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
3.250 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
3.500 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
3.750 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
4.000 0.938 0.013 0.831 0.022 831 022
4.250 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
4.500 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
4.750 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
5.000 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
5.250 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
5.500 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
5.750 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
6.000 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
Infinity 0.938 0.013 0.880 0.014 876 013
D. CONCLUSIONS
The following summarizes the sensitivity of unit
recovery rates to changes in the input parameters:
1. Small variations in personnel probability of degrada-
tion which modeled more realistic probabilities of
exposure for various unit members resulted in insig-
nificant differences in the capability levels.
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TABLE XX
COMPARISON OF MAXIMUM UNIT CAPABILITY
FOR THE BASE CASE AND ALTERNATIVE CASE II
Personnel Materiel Unit
Base Case 0.974 0.923 0.923
Alternative Case II 0.938 0.880 0.876
Broad variations of personnel and materiel probabili-
ties of degradation levels identified the light
infantry company as still being resilient to at least
the 50 percent level of degradation.
Restructuring the number of mission essential teams
from eighteen to nine revealed that the capability
level decreased significantly to the point that the


























































V. SUMMARY , CONCLUSIONS , AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A . SUMMARY
The importance of the light infantry concept is to
provide a capability of rapidly deploying a highly-trained
unit in response to a contingency mission anywhere in the
world. This light force would be particularly effective in
meeting a crisis in a low-intensity scenario such as Grenada
and Lebanon.
This thesis investigated the light infantry company for
a night defensive mission in a nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) environment to identify, from a set of alter-
natives, the force structure that maximizes unit resiliency/
recoverability on the battlefield. The Analysis of Military
Organizational Effectiveness (AMORE) methodology, developed
by Science Applications, Incorporated (SAI), was used to
evaluate the alternatives.
Chapter I discussed the AMORE methodology, the light
infantry concept, and the purpose of this thesis. Chapter
II presented the extensive input data that was developed for
the AMORE model. This data assumed the light infantry
company was performing only the defense mission. The anal-
yses of unit capability are presented in Chapter III. Some
of the areas examined include capability as a function of
time, potential productivity, and available surpluses and
shortages. A sensitivity analysis was conducted in Chapter
IV to investigate the effects of changes in degradation
probabilities and the definition of a mission essential team
on unit reconstitution capabilities.
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B. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of this analysis, the following
conclusions are provided:
1. The light infantry company, as currently designed for
employment in low- intensity conflicts and as analyzed
in this study, possesses resiliency/recoverability
,
as defined by SAI , if it is structured with eighteen
mission essential teams. It is not resilient when
only nine teams are constructed.
2. At a low level of degradation corresponding to the
defense mission (probability of degradation = .10),
the light infantry company is materiel- limited.
However, at higher levels, personnel constraints
become the limiting factors.
3. The choke analysis identified the squad leader and
the team leader as the primary personnel shortfalls
at a 10 percent probability of degradation.
4. Materiel recovery was affected by some low-density
items such as the Dragon and the AN/PRC-77 radio set.
Losses of these key items were found to be extremely
degrading to the company's combat resiliency.
5. The relatively low rate of substitutability is
attributable in part to the large number of technical




The following recommendations are given:
1. Subsequent analyses of the light infantry company
should establish the fire team as the increment of
capability for determining mission essential teams.
2. Further specific areas of study that could complement
this thesis include random exponential simulated
times and increased probabilities of degradation.
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The analyses of the capability of the light infantry
company based on eighteen mission essential teams and
on nine teams raised questions about the definition
of resiliency and what an essential team is believed
to do. This issue should be resolved.
At higher intensity conflicts, augmentation in
personnel and materiel is likely to result in
improved capability. AMORE analyses of the light
infantry company for each type of attack and defense
mission in every scenario of the strategic spectrum
of conflict is needed to provide a complete picture
of the resiliency of the company.
The procedures for determining the probability of
degradation for infantry equipment should be investi-
gated since many of the choke points uncovered by
AMORE may be due to an artificially high degradation
level for materiel.
Increasing the quantities of the critical low-density
items may be appropriate and should be evaluated.
In the sensitivity analysis, an attempt was made to
have various personnel elements of the company have
different risks of being degraded. This concept
suggests that some type of weighting factors, based
upon external analysis such as combat simulations or
Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) methodol-
ogies, could be developed and assigned to each
element to reflect the varying risks.
The value of substitutability is so significant that
every effort should be made by Table of Organization
and Equipment (TOE) builders to insure that all
possible substitutions are recognized and considered
in structuring the organization of a unit.
Cross-training and on-the-job training should be
increased to improve the light infantry company's
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reconstitution ability as a result of greater substi-
tutability. Lower skill level personnel should be
trained to work and plan as effectively as possible
with minimum supervision. Emphasis should be placed
at unit level to train for reconstitution.
10. The application of high technology to reduce materiel
losses or repair times can reap great benefits. Due
to the limited mobility of the light infantry,
continued emphasis must be placed on equipment design
oriented toward reduced size and weight. Some design
criteria would be high reliability and maintain-
ability, man-portability, survivability, and longer
range. This would significantly increase the ability
of the light infantry company to reconstitute.
11. Although the AMORE methodology has value in providing
insights into existing organizations and into indi-
vidual training objectives, it should be used in
conjunction with, not to replace, the present US Army




CHOKE ANALYSIS NEEDS AND SURPLUS
TABLE XXI










2 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00
6 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29
10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21
11 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21
12 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00
13 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00
14 0.17 0.49 0.00 0.00
15 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00
18 0.17 0.39 0.00 0.00
19 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00
20 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.00
21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 0.00 0.00 2.70 0.56
26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
27 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21




30 0.13 0.46 0.00 0.00
31 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00
32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of Iterations = 23.
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TABLE XXII







































Number of Iterations = 27.
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TABLE XXIII










2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
21 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.00
22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
23 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
24 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Number of Iterations = 1.
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TABLE XXIV










2 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.55
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.45
10 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.84
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
15 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.55
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.55
18 0.80 0.45 0.00 0.00
19 0.00 0.00 0.60 1.34
20 0.20 0.45 0.00 0.00
21 0.00 0.00 3.00 1.00
22 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.45
23 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
24 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.45
25 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.45
Number iDf Iterations = 5.
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TABLE XXV








2 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.41
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.83 0.41 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.52
15 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.41
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.52
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.55
21 0.00 0.00 3.50 0.55
22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 0.00 0.00 1.00
.
0.00
24 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.52
25 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.52
Number <}f Iterations = 6.
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TABLE XXVI
CHOKE ANALYSIS DATA - MATERIEL (TEAM 18)
Item
Needs Surplus
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
1 0.26 0.55 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.29 0.46 0.00 0.00
6 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00
7 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.00
8 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00
9 0.47 0.65 0.00 0.00
10 0.45 0.65 0.00 0.00
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.11 0.39 0.00 0.00
13 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00
14 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.00
17 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00
18 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00
19 1.89 1.35 0.00 0.00
20 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00
21 0.00 0.00 3.55 0.69
22 0.37 0.71 0.00 0.00
23 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.27
24 0.24 0.49 O'.OO 0.00
25 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00
Number Df Iterations = 38.
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APPENDIX B
MEAN CAPABILITY FOR VARIOUS LEVELS OF PROBABILITY OF
DEGRADATION
TABLE XXVII







394 0.033 0.589 0.034 376 027
0.250 747 0.043 0.618 0.032 596 035
0.500 962 0.011 0.699 0.035 699 035
0.750 974 0.007 0.797 0.025 797 025
1.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
1.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
1.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
1.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
2.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
2.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
2.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
2.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
3.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
3.250 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
3.500 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
3.750 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
4.000 974 0.007 0.798 0.025 798 025
4.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
4.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
4.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
5.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
5.250 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
5.500 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
5.750 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
6.000 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
Infinity 974 0.007 0.923 0.010 923 010
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TABLE XXVIII







330 0.028 0.482 0.029 316 023
0.250 564 0.047 0.522 0.028 458 034
0.500 837 0.020 0.658 0.024 648 025
0.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
1.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
1.250 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
1.500 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
1.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
2.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
2.250 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
2.500 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
2.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
3.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
3.250 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
3.500 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
3.750 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
4.000 858 0.009 0.717 0.022 714 021
4.250 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
4.500 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
4.750 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
5.000 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
5.250 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
5.500 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
5.750 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
6.000 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
Infinity 858 0.009 0.882 0.017 839 014
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TABLE XXIX







0.290 0.027 0.347 0.027 254 024
0.250 • 0.452 0.047 0.379 0.023 323 028
0.500 0.614 0.057 0.589 0.029 500 047
0.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
1.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
1.250 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
1.500 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
1.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
2.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
2.250 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
2.500 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
2.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
3.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
3.250 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
3.500 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
3.750 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
4.000 0.749 0.011 0.644 0.023 643 023
4.250 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
4.500 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
4.750 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
5.000 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
5.250 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
5.500 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
5.750 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
6.000 0.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
Infinity 0T.749 0.011 0.819 0.021 732 012
81
TABLE XXX







239 0.024 0.261 0.028 206 024
- 0.250 394 0.035 0.287 0.025 256 024
0.500 568 0.043 0.512 0.036 454 043
0.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
1.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
1.250 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
1.500 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
1.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
2.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
2.250 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
2.500 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
2.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
3.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
3.250 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
3.500 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
3.750 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
4.000 649 0.011 0.591 0.026 576 024
4.250 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 015
4.500 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 ,640 .015
4.750 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 .015
5.000 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 015
5.250 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 .015
5.500 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 015
5.750 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 015
6.000 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 640 .015
Infinity 649 0.011 0.781 0.025 .640 .015
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TABLE XXXI







.197 0.023 0.197 0.025 144 019
0.250 320 0.032 0.229 0.023 199 021
0.500 446 0.036 0.430 0.033 358 035
0.750 518 0.021 0.521 0.025 471 022
1.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
1.250 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
1.500 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
1.750 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
2.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
2.250 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
2.500 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
2.750 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
3.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
3.250 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
3.500 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
3.750 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
4.000 518 0.021 0.522 0.025 471 022
4.250 518 0.021 0.770 0.019 518 021
4.500 518 0.021 0.770 0.019 518 021
4.750 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 021
5.000 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 021
5.250 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 021
5.500 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 021
5.750 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 021
6.000 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 518 021
Infinity 518 0.021 0.771 0.019 * 518 021
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